I.
INTRODUCTION
Pragmatics is often described as the study of language
use (Sperber and Wilson, 2005: 468). It is one of the branches of Semiotics, a
science of signs (Nőth, 1995: 3). In this instance, Pragmatics deals with the
study of the relation of signs to interpreters. Whereas the other two branches of
Semiotics include Syntactics or Syntax, the study of formal relations of signs
to one another, and Semantics, the study of the relation of signs to the
objects to which the signs are applicable (Levinson, 1995: 1). Within this
threefold branch, only Pragmatics can be investigated. It is due to the fact
that only Pragmatics may discover people’s intended meanings, their
assumptions, their purposes or goals, and the sorts of actions when they are
performing when they speak (Yule, 1996: 3).
Pragmatics plays an important role in studying language
as a tool of human interaction, i.e. the interaction between the speaker and
the hearer . To understand human interaction, we have to understand
‘interactional’ meanings expressed in speech and we must have appropriate
analytical devices to clarify such meanings (Wierzbicka, 1991: 1,5.).
Pragmatics as a field of linguistic inquiry was
initiated in the 1930s by the philosopher Charles Morries, Carnap, and Pierce.
They cited that syntax addressed the formal relations of signs to one of
another, semantics the relation of signs to what they denote, and pragmatics
the relation of signs to their users and interpreters.
The present paper mainly addresses the basic notions
or fundamentals of Pragmatics. In particular, it extends the discussions of the
following problems:
·
What is defined as Pragmatics?
·
What are the basic principles of Pragmatics?
·
What is the scope of Pragmatics?
II.
THE DEFINITION OF PRAGMATICS
There are many definitions of Pragmatics proposed by
many experts. Mey (1994: 3) has suggested that Pragmatics is a science that has
something to do with language and its users. Pragmatics as a field of
linguistic inquiry was initiated in the 1930s by the philosopher Charles
Morries, Carnap, and Pierce. They cited that Syntax addressed the formal
relations of signs to one of another, Semantics the relation of signs to what
they denote, and Pragmatics the relation of signs to their users and
interpreters (Morris in Horn and Ward, 2007: xi).
Whereas Yule (1996: 3) has cited that Pragmatics deals
with the study of meaning as communicated by a speaker or a writer and
interpreted by a listener or reader. This implies that Pragmatics is the study
of speaker meaning since it deals more with what the speaker means by uttering
than what the words or phrases in the utterance mean. It also implies that
Pragmatics is the study of contextual meaning as it covers the interpretation
of what people means in a particular context and how the context influences
what is said. In addition, it has an implication that Pragmatics is the study
of how more gets communicated than is said due to the fact that it investigates
how listeners may draw inferences about what is said or what the speaker
intends to say. Last but not least, Pragmatics is the study of the expression
of relative distance, meaning that how close or distant the listener is, the
speaker determines how much needs to be said.
To sum up, Pragmatics is the study of those
context-dependent aspects of meaning regardless of the construction of content
or logical form. To draw the meaning, we should take into consideration how
speakers come up to express what they want to say regarding who they are
talking to, where, when, and under what circumstances.
III.
THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PRAGMATICS
Historically,
there is nothing strange in the use of ‘principle’ as a concept in linguistics
as in many other branches of science. The word ‘principle’ usually connotes
‘understanding’ on all levels of linguistic sophistication, from the sharing of
elementary knowledge to high-level, metatheoretical speculation (Mey, 1994:
53). As Pragmatics plays an important role in
studying a language as tool of human interaction, i.e. the interaction between
the speaker and the hearer, it shows that the essence of language is human activity- activity on the
part of one individual to make himself understood by another, and activity on
the part of that other to understand what was in the mind of the first.
Successful communication takes place when speakers share knowledge, beliefs,
and assumptions and when they adhere to similar rules of cooperative
interactions. This, accordingly, reveals the basic principles of Pragmatics
that include: (a) the cooperative principles and (b) the politeness strategies.
The following illustrates how both principles are connected.
If two parties use an instrument for an ‘activity’, then
such an activity can only be successful if both parties adhere to general rules
or principles and thereby utilize certain strategies. This can be illustrated
with the following non-linguistic example. If two people want to hang a
painting (activity), the use a hammer, nails and a ladder (instruments), and
they have to coordinate their actions. There will have to be some cooperation;
while one is standing on the ladder, the other can hand the tools to the first,
etc. Rules concerning politeness will also have to be followed; while one is on
the ladder, the other should not try to push the first off. One general
principle of collective activity is ‘cooperation’ and an often-used strategy to
achieve this is ‘politeness’. This is also true in the case of verbal
communication (Renkema, 1993).
A. The Cooperative Principles
The cooperative principle says ‘Make your conversational
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the
accepted purpose or direction of the speech exchange in which you are engaged.
Grice distinguished four categories within these general principles. He
formulated these in basic rules or maxims. In two categories he also introduced supermaxims:
(1)
Maxims of quantity
a.
Make your contribution as informative as is required (for
the current purposes of the exchange
b.
Do not make your contribution more informative than is
required.
(2)
Maxims of quality
Supermaxims:
Try to make your contribution one that is true.
Maxims:
a. Do not say what you believe to be false
b.
Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence
(3)
Maxims of Relevance
Be
relevant.
(4)
Maxims of manner
Supermaxims
: Be perspicuous (easily understood)
a.
Avoid obscurity of expression
b.
Avoid ambiguity
c.
Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)
d. Be orderly
(Renkema, 1993)
B. The Politeness Strategies
Much of what we say and a great of what we communicate is
usually determined by our relationships. A linguistic interaction is necessarily
a social interaction. In order to make sense what is said in an interaction, we
have to look at various factors that relate to social distance and closeness.
Some of these factors are established prior to an interaction and hence are
largely external factors, for examples:
Ø Social
distance and status (age and power)
Speakers
who see themselves as lower status in English speaking context tend to mark
social distance between themselves and higher status speakers by using address
forms that include a title and a last name, but not the first name
Ø Degrees of
friendliness or formality (Yule, 1996).
Irving Gofmann, a social psychologist, suggests that every
participant in the social process has the need to be appreciated by others and
the need to be free and not interfered with. They expect that people generally
behave concerning their public self-image or face wants (Renkema, 1993)
As a technical term, face means the public self-image of a
person. It refers to
that emotional and social sense of self that everyone has and expects everyone
else to recognize. Politeness, in an interaction, can then be defined as the
means employed to show awareness of another person’ face.
In this sense, politeness can be accomplished in situations
of social distance or closeness. Showing awareness for another person’s face
when that other seems socially distant is often described in terms or respect
or deference. Showing the equivalent awareness when the other is socially close
is often described in terms of friendliness or solidarity. (Yule, 1996)
If a speaker says something that represent a threat to
another individual’s expectation regarding self-image, for example, refusing a
request or reproaching someone, it is described as a face threatening act. In
this case something is needed which will reduce the violation of face to a
minimum and therefore preserve stability as much as possible. This can be
achieved by using ‘face work techniques’. This refers to a face-saving act when
someone can say something to lessen the possible threat. (Renkema, 1993)
When we attempt to save another’s face, we should pay
attention to their negative face wants or positive face wants. A person
negative face is the need to be independent, to have freedom of action, and not
to be imposed by others. The word ‘negative’ here does not mean ‘bad’, it is
just the opposite pole from ‘positive’. A person’ s positive face is the need
to be accepted , even liked, by others, to be treated as the member of the same
group, and to know that his or her wants are shared by others. In simple terms,
negative face is the need to be independent and positive face is the need to be
connected.
So, a face saving act which is oriented to the person’s
negative face is called negative politeness or respect politeness. This tends
to show respect or deference, emphasize the importance of the other’s time and
concerns, and even include an apology for the imposition or interruption. A
face saving act that is concerned with the person’s positive face is called
positive politeness or solidarity politeness. This tends to show solidarity,
emphasize that both speakers want the same thing, and that they have the same
goal. For example, the following
utterances:
(1a) Close the door.
(1b) There’s a draft.
(1c) Would you close the door?
(1d) Would you be so kind as to close the door?
According
to the maxims of the cooperative principle, (1a) is sufficient. Language is,
however, often more indirectly, as is done in (1b). They also sometimes use
politeness forms such as in (1c) and (1d).
IV.
THE SCOPE OF PRAGMATICS
A.
Implicature
Implicature is a component of speaker meaning that
constitutes an aspect of what is meant in a speaker’ utterance without being
part of what is said (Horn and Ward, 2007: 3). The implicature is situated
within conversation, with the inferences being made by people who happen to
hear the utterances and attempt to maintain the assumption of cooperative
interaction. Because the implicature is a part of what is communicated and not
said, speakers can always deny that they intended to communicate such meanings
(Yule, 1996: 44). For example,
Carol: Are coming to the party tonight?
Linda: I’ve got an exam tomorrow.
On the face of this short dialogue, Linda’s statement is
not an answer to Carol’s question. Linda does not say Yes or No. Yet Carol will
immediately interpret the statement as meaning ‘No’ or ‘Probably Not’. Given
Linda’s original answer contains relevant information, Carol can work out that
‘exam tomorrow’ conventionally involves ‘study tonight’, and ‘study tonight’
precludes ‘party tonight’. Thus, Linda’s answer is not simply a statement about
tomorrow’s activities, it contains an implicature (an additional conveyed
meaning) concerning tonight’s activities.
B.
Presupposition
When we use a referring expression like, this, he or Shakespeare, we usually assume that our listeners can recognize
which referent is intended. Some of these assumptions may be mistaken but
mostly they are appropriate. What a speaker or writer assumes is true or known
by the listeners or readers may be described as ‘presupposition’ (Yule, 2006:
117). Presuppositions are viewed as complex dispositions which are manifested
in linguistic behavior. One has presuppositions in virtue of the statements he
makes, the questions he asks, the commands he issues. Presuppositions are
propositions implicitly supposed before the relevant linguistic business is
transacted (Horn and Ward, 2007: 33). For example, if someone tells us, “Your
brother is waiting outside,” there is an obvious presupposition that we have a
brother.
C.
Speech Acts
Speech Acts are acts done in the
process of speaking. This, however are not completely covered under one or more
of the major divisions of grammar- phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax,
semantics- or under some general theory of action. The speech act
theory focuses on the question of what people are doing when they use language.
In speech act theory, language is seen as a form of acting (Renkema, 1993).
Speech is described as a form of action and words as instruments with which
actions can be performed. ‘I promise that I will give you the money tomorrow’,
for instance, an act is being formed in the form of an utterance. Something is
not only being said, more importantly, something is being done. By saying ‘I
promise …’, a promise is made.
According to the English philosopher, John Austin (1976),
all expressions of language must be reviewed as acts. He distinguished three
kinds of action within each utterance:
(a)
The locution (The locutionary act): the physical act of
producing an utterance.
It is what the speaker is saying.
(b)
The illocution (the illocutionary act): the act which is
committed by producing an utterance.
It is what is in the speaker’s mind or what is intended to
say. By uttering a promise, a promise is made; by uttering a threat, a threat
is made.
(c)
The perlocution (the perlocutionary act): the production of
an effect through locution and illocution.
It is what reaction comes up.
This reveals in the following example. In the statement
‘There is a draft in here’, the locution is the production of the utterance.
Depending on the situation, the illocution could be a request, an order, a
complaint, etc. The perlocution could be that a door or window is closed or
that the addressee replies that he is not a servant.
D.
Reference
Reference can be defined as things that are overtly
mentioned in the utterance of a sentence (the
“aboutness”). We may define ‘reference’ as an act by which a speaker or a
writer uses language to enable listener (or reader) to identify something
(Yule, 2006: 115) The types of words
and phrases that display reference include demonstratives and indexical words
and phrases (e.g. this table, that cat,
I, this), proper names (Lady Diana Spencer, London), and singular definite
terms (the woman sitting, by the table,
the author of “Harry Potter”) (Horn and Ward, 2007: 75-76).
E.
Deixis
There are some very common words in our language that
cannot be interpreted at all if we do not know the context, especially the
physical context of the speaker. Deixis is the study of deictic or indexical
expressions in language, like you, now,
today. The word today, for
example, has a constant meaning, but systematically varying reference. It can
be regarded as a special kind of grammatical property instantiated the familiar
categories of person, tense, place, etc. Deixis introduces subjective,
attentional, intentional, and context-dependent properties into natural
languages. It is one of the core areas of Pragmatics (ibid.: 97, 100).
They are technically known as known as deictic expressions, from the Greek word
‘deixis’ which means ‘pointing’ via language. Deictic expressions are also
sometimes called indexicals. We use
deixis to point things (it, this, these
books), sometimes called person
deixis, to point a location (here,
there, near that), sometimes called spatial
deixis, and to point a time (now,
then, last year), sometimes called temporal
deixis (Yule, 1996: 9)
F.
Definiteness and Indefiniteness (Anaphora)
The prototypes of definiteness an indefiniteness in
English are the definite article the and
the indefinite article a/an, and
singular noun phrases determined by them (Horn and Ward, 2007: 122). We usually
make a distinction between introducing new referents (a man) and referring back to them (the man). In this type o referential relationship, the second (or
subsequent) referring expression is an example of ‘anaphora’ (‘referring
back’), while the first mention is called ‘antecedent’ (Yule, 1996: 22-23).
V.
CONCLUSION
Based on the previous discussion, we can draw a
conclusion that besides there is the conceptual meanings and the relationships
between words, there are other aspects of meaning that depend more on context
and the communicative intentions of speakers. Communication clearly depends on
not only recognizing the meaning of words in an utterance, but recognizing what
speakers mean by their utterances. The study of what speakers mean is called
Pragmatics.
In many ways, Pragmatics is the study of ‘invisible’
meaning, or how we recognize what is meant even when it is not actually said or
written. In order that to happen, speakers or writers must be able to rely on a
wide variety of shared assumptions and expectations when they try to
communicate. The investigation of those assumptions and expectations provides
us with how more is always being communicated than is said. Pragmatics is
needed if we want a fuller, deeper, and generally more reasonable account of
human language behavior. As it is still dynamically growing and developing,
Pragmatics will carry on capturing the richness of the developments between
people using language.
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